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Robbery, Pragmatic Encroachment, and the Knowledge Norm of Action 
One of the salutary features of Timothy Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, 
which he most thoroughly defends in Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), is its explanation and 
defense of knowledge norms for assertion and action. Williamsonian knowledge, in other words, 
is partly justified by its ability to explain why we do and should speak and act in certain ways. His 
defense of knowledge norms is, however, the subject of several critiques. The line of criticism that 
I will address in this piece argues that Williamson’s argument for the knowledge norm of action 
is in tension with his account of knowledge as a non-luminous mental state. In short, contra 
Williamson, knowledge must be iterable to (together with our desires) explain and justify why one 
should act differently than someone with mere justified true belief in a variety of cases, including 
Williamson’s own robbery case. The ‘KK Thesis’ that requires knowledge to iterable such that 
you only know something when you know that you know it is flatly inconsistent with Williamson’s 
text.1 Williamson appears to be forced in the position of amending (or, worse, abandoning) the 
knowledge norm of action or accepting KK. Accepting KK would too radically alter Williamson’s 
view. This tension raises the question of how to salvage a similar knowledge norm of action if one 
is amenable to the knowledge-first program.  
In this work, I will argue that pragmatic encroachment provides a solution to the apparent 
tension in Williamson’s view.2 This fit with and solution of a tension in a leading view in modern 
epistemology should serve as further (non-dispositive) evidence for the plausibility of pragmatic 
encroachment. First, I provide basic information about Williamson’s view. Next, I rehearse the 
argument that a tension exists in Williamson’s view. The argument is structurally similar to David 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of other arguments against the knowledge norm of action, see McGlynn (2014, 135-137).  
2 ‘Pragmatic encroachment’ also goes by other names, including ‘interest-relativism’. See e.g., Stanley (2006) and 
Weatherson (2012). 
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Sosa’s argument against the knowledge norm of assertion (2009), but also highlights an action-
specific internal tension in Williamson’s project evident in his own ‘robbery’ case. Then, I canvass 
possible solutions to the tension and identify weaknesses with solutions that do not acknowledge 
pragmatic encroachment. Next, I argue that pragmatic encroachment best resolves the issue in 
Williamson’s robbery case and other important (predominantly high stakes) cases where KK 
seems plausible, partly by arguing that alternatives require more radical departures from his view. 
Finally, I reply to potential objections. 
If I succeed in making my case that the tension between Williamson’s argument against 
luminosity and his argument for the explanatory value of knowledge as a norm of action can best 
be resolved through the supplementation of his view to recognize pragmatic encroachment, I will 
help complete a Williamsonian picture of the knowledge norm of action. I will also provide an 
argument for pragmatic encroachment: pragmatic encroachment helps solves a theoretical problem 
at the center of one of the leading programs in contemporary epistemology. While Williamson 
would resist the inclusion of pragmatic encroachment in his knowledge-first epistemology, 
pragmatic encroachment-recognition is the least radical revision to Williamson’s picture that 
resolves the tension above. Despite Williamson’s objections, then, knowledge-first epistemology 
should be supplemented to recognize that practical facts about stakes help determine the 
relationship between knowledge and action. Pragmatic encroachment should be an important 
element of Williamsonian knowledge-based explanations of action.  
Williamson’s Argument for the Knowledge Norm of Action 
The question in this text is, again, how to resolve an apparent tension between 
Williamson’s arguments for knowledge as a non-analyzable and non-luminous mental state and 
the knowledge norm of action respectively. While I assume familiarity with Williamson’s larger 
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project here, it is important to provide some preliminary details for those new to the debate. Doing 
so can make the claimed tension clearer. This section thus briefly explains the basic features of 
Williamson’s account of knowledge and argument for the knowledge norm of action. The next 
section will explain how parts of his account present a tension I seek to resolve below. 
While knowledge-first epistemology famously holds that knowledge is not factorizable 
(viz., cannot be divided into constituent parts such as ‘justification’, ‘truth’ and ‘belief’), 
knowledge must have four primary features in Williamson.3 Per Williamson, knowledge is (i) a 
mental state that is (ii) factive and (iii) non-analyzable (47). It is also (iv) non-luminous where a 
mental state is luminous if and only if “[f]or every case ∝, if in ∝ C obtains, then in ∝ one is in a 
position to know that C obtains” (2000, 44). Williamson accordingly denies “(KK) For any 
pertinent proposition p, if [a person] knows p then he knows that he knows p” (113). Knowledge 
thus does not need to be iterable: one does need to know that one knows C in order to know C.  
Knowledge-first epistemology’s commitment to the knowledge norm of action is also taken 
to be a constitutive element of the view.4 While one can subscribe to a version of knowledge-first 
epistemology without subscribing to the knowledge norm of action, the knowledge of action is 
central to Williamson’s version of knowledge-first epistemology and serves as one of the key 
motivating forces for subscribing to any knowledge-first view. The knowledge norm of action 
holds that “[o]ne ought to treat P as a reason for acting only if one knows that P” (McGlynn 2014, 
132, paraphrasing Hawthorne & Stanley 2008).5 Williamson famously does not defend the 
                                                 
3 McGlynn (2014, 14-18) identifies six key theses, but they are not all propositional and are not all about knowledge 
so much as the basic features of his broader epistemology. They are: “Knowledge is unanalysable.”, “Knowledge is 
prior to belief.”, “Knowledge is prior to justification.”, “Knowledge is the ‘Unexplained Explainer’.”, “Knowledge 
norms.”, and “Knowledge as the most important mental state with mind-to-world fit.” 
4 Ibid. 
5 McGlynn (2014, 132) sees a second version of the norm in Hawthorne & Stanley (2008), but he does not pursue it: 
“One ought to rely on P as a premise in one’s practical reasoning only if one knows that P.” Nothing changes below 
if one adopts this alternative articulation. 
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knowledge norm of action in detail. He instead presents a sustained argument for a knowledge 
norm of assertion (Williamson 2000, Chapter 11) and leaves it open to others to recognize how his 
arguments can be used to make an analogous case for a knowledge norm of action.6 Williamson’s 
most direct argument for the knowledge norm of action is case-based. He presents a robber 
searching for a diamond in a residence and argues that the robber should and will stay in the house 
longer if he has knowledge than he would if he merely had a justified true belief: “the probability 
of his ransacking the house all night, conditional on his having entered it believing that there was 
a diamond in it, is lower than the probability if his ransacking it all night, conditional on his having 
entered it knowing that there was a diamond in it” (62). This robbery case, Williamson claims, is 
just one of many cases where people with knowledge do and should act differently than those with 
mere justified true belief. There are many cases where one cannot substitute true belief for 
knowledge without suffering from explanatory loss (62). This is because different epistemic states 
warrant different actions (even where desires, the non-epistemic requirements for actions, remain 
constant). 
The Challenge 
Williamson’s version of the knowledge norm of action is, however, subject to a line of 
criticism that is similar to one of the more damning critiques of the knowledge norm of assertion. 
Sosa’s critique of the knowledge norm of assertion demonstrates that the knowledge norm of 
assertion does not generalize to a number of cases unless we “accept additional controversial 
principles” and/or adopt KK in particular (2009, 270-271). Sosa understands that the primary 
contribution of Williamson’s knowledge norm of assertion is that it explains the oddity of asserting 
                                                 
6 See McGlynn (2014, 132) for a caveat to this traditional understanding: “The case for the knowledge norm of action 
closely parallels that for the knowledge norm of assertion, except that there is no direct analogue of Moore’s paradox.” 
Note that I use male gender pronouns in discussing the case that motivates the knowledge of action because 
Williamson does so in the original case and a robber is a negative character in any case.  
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“P but I don’t know that P”: P in this case “cannot be known” and only the assertion of that which 
one knows is felicitous (270). Yet this approach cannot account for the oddness of “P but I don’t 
know whether I know that P” without postulating the KK principle (270). So, Williamsonian 
knowledge cannot ground a plausible knowledge norm of action. Sosa further argues that 
Williamson’s norm of action may require iteration that leads to KK, which Sosa and Williamson 
deny. Per Sosa, the view “will have to be strengthened implausibly, to require, for every level, 
knowledge that you know…that you know that P” (271). The knowledge norm of assertion only 
accounts for common examples of similarly odd assertions with epistemic content when the 
knowledge that can play this normative role is frequently iterated in a way that may require KKK. 
These controversial principles and KK are both unpalatable to Sosa, who says “we should consider 
giving up on the presupposition that there is a particular norm distinctive of assertion as such” 
(271). But this need not be the only response to the tension. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given that Williamson’s argument for the knowledge norm of 
action is largely an analogy to his argument for the knowledge norm of assertion, an argument that 
is structurally similar to Sosa’s case also applies to (at least Williamson’s version of) the 
knowledge norm of action. In short, just as Sosa shows that knowledge needs to be iterative to 
justify assertion across a large number of cases, knowledge needs to be iterative to justify action 
across a large number of cases.7 Williamson’s account requires that non-iterable knowledge in 
particular can serve as a norm for action. Denial of KK is central to Williamson’s knowledge-first 
                                                 
7 My argument for this claim does not rely on a “commonality” thesis (as identified and criticized by Brown 2012 and 
discussed in e.g., Gerken 2014) whereby assertion and action both should be subject to the same epistemic norm. Nor 
does it rely on a negative inverse of the commonality thesis whereby an attack on one knowledge norm necessarily 
serves as an attack on another. Saying that the knowledge norms of actions and assertion suffer from similar defects 
does not necessarily entail or imply that the norms stand and fall together. My argument does, however, suggest that 
the knowledge norm of action is subject to a criticism that is structurally similar to Sosa’s particular argument against 
the knowledge norm of assertion. 
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epistemology. Yet non-luminous ‘knowledge’ cannot be a norm for action in many circumstances. 
Non-iterative knowledge no more justifies action than justified true belief in many cases. In fact, 
I submit, Williamson’s own robbery case presents a challenge to Williamson’s claim that 
knowledge could be non-luminous and serve as the norm for action.  
While the basics of my argument for the tension between non-luminosity and the norm for 
action appears elsewhere, it is necessary to rehearse the basics of this view here to understand my 
argument. Once one sees that the tension forces Williamson to either (a) give up on anti-luminosity 
or the norm for action or (b) supplement Williamson’s picture with pragmatic encroachment, one 
should see that (b) is the less radical and more defensible change to the Williamsonian picture, as 
I argue below. As I summarize the position elsewhere, in many cases, including Williamson’s own 
robber case, 
[o]nly those acting on the basis of an iterated knowledge-desire pair will act differently 
than those acting on the basis of a belief-desire pair. One can plausibly argue that the robber 
needs to know that he knows that there is a diamond in the house for him to stay in the 
house any longer than an individual with a justified true belief. If one does not know that 
one knows that there is a diamond in the house, one may be acting on the basis of something 
functionally equivalent to a justified true belief. Lack of knowledge about one’s epistemic 
states will forestall one’s acting on the basis of reasons that epistemic state may give him 
or her. Whether these people do act differently is a task for experimental philosophers; 
those who posit an uniterable knowledge norm of action face the onus of proving that 
uniterable knowledge motivates people in different ways than belief. If the person with 
knowledge only stays in the house for the same amount of time as the person with a justified 
true belief, then only iterated knowledge plays the explanatory role in action that helps 
explain why there is a knowledge norm of action (omitted for blind review). 
 
To put the point more succinctly, there exists a significant number of cases where knowledge must 
be iterative to explain why people do and should act differently on the basis of knowledge than 
justified true belief. While knowledge does not always need to be iterable or iterative to serve this 
explanatory function that is distinctive of the case for a knowledge norm of belief, the existence 
of this significant number of cases where iteration is necessary presents a serious tension in 
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Williamson: these cases undermine the case for the knowledge norm of action or the case for anti-
luminosity. One may be forced to choose between them to plausibly explain the cases. Indeed, the 
robber in Williamson’s own distinctive knowledge norm of assertion would and should only act 
differently from the robber with a mere justified true belief in the location of the diamond if he 
knew that he knew that there was a diamond in the house. The fact that Williamson’s own case 
raises the tension between his argument for the knowledge norm of action and his denial of KK is 
suggestive of a larger problem with Williamson’s view.  
The argument for a tension between Williamson’s knowledge norm of action and 
Williamson’s anti-luminosity is structurally similar to Sosa’s argument against the knowledge 
norm of assertion, but it differs in two important ways. First, it suggests that Williamson’s own 
example undermines his view. It thus demonstrates a problem internal to Williamson’s project. 
Sosa focuses on a more general problem and creates new cases as counterexamples. The 
identification of an internal tension in Williamson’s view is new. Second, my argument is not 
supposed to be an argument against the adoption of knowledge norms. I hope to resolve the tension 
I present. The internal problem I identify is suggestive of a more general problem with the 
knowledge norm of action, but I do not pursue that line of reasoning here. In the following, I 
explain how one can resolve the internal tension in the case of the robber in the house. The best 
solution of that case will generalize for other cases as the benefits of my resolution of the tension 
in that case will also apply in other cases where Williamson’s knowledge norm of action seems 
plausible. As I argue below, it is particularly valuable in the high stakes where the temptation to 
say that one must adopt KK as part of the knowledge norm of action is highest. I do not, of course, 
argue that a version of KK that recognizes pragmatic encroachment best resolves the identified 
tension in Williamson’s view. Adopting KK in any form would be a radical view Williamson 
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cannot accept with fundamentally altering his view and a pragmatic encroachment-based version 
of KK is especially implausible as it seems to require knowledge of stakes in order to act in all 
cases, which is too strong in most cases. Rather, I will argue that a knowledge norm of action that 
makes more evidence necessary to act as stakes raise is both plausible and a less radical departure 
from the general Williamsonian picture than alternative possibilities. 
Possible Solutions 
If knowledge cannot play its explanatory and normative role in action in the absence of its 
constitutive features, (i)-(iv) above, then knowledge as Williamson understands it cannot serve as 
the norm for action in the way that Williamson proposes. In this text, I seek to examine how one 
can resolve the apparent tension in Williamson’s view if the argument for tension in the last section 
succeeds. I am not as skeptical as Sosa about the possibility of distinctive norms of assertion or 
action in general or the knowledge norm of action in particular. For the purposes of this work, 
then, grant that, at least for a large number of cases, people (justifiably) act differently with iterable 
knowledge than people with justified true beliefs, but it is unclear whether people with non-iterable 
knowledge also act differently than those with justified true beliefs. If this is true (as I argue 
elsewhere), the presence of non-iterable knowledge may not help explain or justify action in the 
way we would expect a knowledge norm of action to do. This would produce the tension between 
Williamson’s knowledge norm of action and his commitment to the non-luminosity of knowledge. 
I then ask: What should one do in the face of this tension?  
The plausibility of my resolution to this tension, the adoption of pragmatic encroachment, 
is made clear by first focusing on the deficiencies of alternative approaches. One could, of course, 
simply abandon either knowledge-first epistemology or the knowledge norm of action. As noted 
already, Sosa takes this tack. Aidan McGlynn then surveys the knowledge-first literature and 
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suggests that the best response to other problems with the knowledge norm of assertion: one should 
either adopt a less demanding standard, such as a justified belief standard, or “hold that the 
epistemic demands on when one can treat a proposition as a reason for action vary depending on 
the circumstances, perhaps requiring knowledge under certain – but not all – conditions” (2014, 
134-135).8 The former move denies the knowledge norm of action. That is unpalatable. The latter 
suggests it only applies under certain circumstances. This latter move may thereby offer a solution 
to the tension above: non-luminous knowledge is only a norm for certain actions. Yet it is 
unsatisfying if it makes Williamson’s paradigm knowledge norm of action case an example of 
where the conditions for knowledge do not apply. Further, if, as I contend, there are many cases 
where luminosity would be required, the circumstances in which the knowledge norm of action 
would not apply in the latter approach may be sufficiently great as to raise doubts about whether 
it can generate general principles we expect to arise for epistemic norms. 
If one is still tempted by a Williamson-inspired knowledge-first epistemology and/or a 
Williamsonian knowledge norm of action, one should resolve the apparent tension in his view in 
a manner that allows the knowledge norm of action to apply generally, as he intended it, or at the 
very least allows it to apply to his paradigm case. This resolution has not been attempted thus far. 
I will attempt it. There are two obvious candidate resolutions: (1) adopt KK or (2) add another 
component to the Williamsonian project to explain the differences in actions across the cases. The 
following two paragraphs explain why the first option is unpalatable. The remainder of this work 
then goes on to explain how best to approach the second option. Rather than concede defeat on the 
possibility of a knowledge norm of action or adopt KK (or otherwise recognizing luminosity), I 
                                                 
8 Importantly, McGlynn ‘brackets’ the stakes/pragmatic encroachment question that is central below in his own 
chapter on the knowledge norm of action; McGlynn suggests that the stakes question is one of the few issues that does 
not mirror those in the assertion chapter (2014, 131). My view is that the stakes question is central because pragmatic 
encroachment can help resolve a tension in Williamson’s view. 
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will argue that Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology should recognize pragmatic 
encroachment. This version of Option (2) does not abandon Williamson’s larger project and still 
fixes the knowledge norm of action by eliminating the tension above. 
The problem with Option (1), the adoption of KK, stems both from facts about what it 
means to be a Williamsonian and facts about knowledge as an explanatory norm for action. First, 
while Option (1) continues to gain some traction in the literature for independent reasons (e.g., 
Greco 2014) and scholars question the strength of Williamson’s argument against KK (e.g., 
Stalnaker 2015), adding KK to the knowledge-first project would be a radical revision of 
Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology. Indeed, it is hard to consider any Option (1) position 
Williamsonian given how vehemently Williamson opposes KK in Knowledge and its Limits and 
elsewhere. Such a move is thus unavailable to those who are tempted by the Williamsonian picture 
of either knowledge simpliciter or knowledge as a norm for action.  
One could subscribe to the knowledge norm of action without being a Williamsonian,9 but 
if one then decides to adopt Option (1), an even more pressing concern remains. In short, second, 
it is not clear that even knowing that you know suffices to explain one’s rational action in several 
cases. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley’s work on high stakes makes this second concern clear. 
To simplify their argument, Williamsonian knowledge gives one probability 1 concerning the truth 
of a given proposition (Hawthorne & Stanley 2008, 574n3). To know p is thus to be able to act on 
p. We can, however, know banal things and it is not clear that we do or can justifiably act on them 
all. High stakes bets make this problem particularly acute. Williamson seems to suggest knowing 
                                                 
9 Fantl & McGrath independently develop a theory of pragmatic encroachment in non-Williamsonian terms in e.g., 
(2007). They suggest that the argument that stakes are relevant for knowledge prescriptions goes back at least as far 
as (Hookway 1990). Some of the most famous cases that raise sympathetic intuitions appear in (DeRose 1992). Brown 
(2014) describes Fantl & McGrath’s view as the ‘Relevance Approach’ and contrasts it with Hawthorne & Stanley’s 
‘Unity Approach’. I take Hawthorne & Stanley’s Williamsonian route to pragmatic encroachment, but my own view 
is closer to a Relevance Approach than a Unity Approach (and I suspect Hawthorne & Stanley could be charitably 
read to adopt a similar view). 
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that you will win a given bet provides grounds for acting on it. This is implausible in high stakes 
bet cases. You may ‘know’ that you will win, but if the stakes are sufficiently high, it is unlikely 
that you are warranted in acting on that knowledge. Even knowing that you know will not suffice 
to justify your taking on such large risks (particularly if they could impact others). Some form of 
Option (2) thus appears necessary to solve the tension in Williamson’s view. A form that accounts 
for high stakes cases, including high stakes bets, would be particularly valuable. A form that 
includes pragmatic encroachment is best able to do so. 
High Stakes and the Difficulties of a Fully Williamsonian Approach to Option (2) 
Option 2, in any of its forms, does not, of course, suggest that one must add something to 
knowledge to address this concern. It merely suggests that one should add something to 
Williamson’s picture. Given the apparently primitive and unanalyzable nature of knowledge, 
anything added to it would seem to be redundant even if it could be added to knowledge; any 
position that rests on an additive theory of knowledge runs risks turning into a non-Williamsonian 
approach. If one wishes to maintain consistency with the spirit of Williamson’s knowledge-first 
view, one cannot add new components to knowledge. At most, one can suggest that knowledge 
conditions differ slightly than Williamson would have us believe. Recognition that pragmatic 
factors can encroach on knowledge does not change the structure of Williamsonian knowledge, so 
much as change its relationship to facts about the world. Where it also can explain the differences 
in action in high stakes cases, it is the best candidate for fulfilling Option (2). If this is true, then 
pragmatic encroachment, as developed by e.g., Williamson supporters Hawthorne and Stanley, 
can resolve the tension above. This should count in favor of recognizing pragmatic encroachment 
in an account of knowledge. 
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Before accepting pragmatic encroachment as the best specification of Option (2), however, 
I should test alternative candidates. Given space limitations, I can unfortunately only cover one 
whose defects are suggestive of problems with other views here. I propose that the alternative I 
will address cannot account for the problem of high stakes and that my suggested supplement, 
pragmatic encroachment, may be necessary to deal with the problem of high stakes regardless of 
whether one subscribes to a knowledge-first epistemology. If this is so, then pragmatic 
encroachment is independently necessary and other versions of (2) will need a pragmatic 
encroachment supplement. The latter facts counts against those other versions. 
To make the strongest case possible for Williamson’s followers, I focus here on an 
alternative, non-pragmatic encroachment-adopting version of Option (2) that may not even result 
in the addition of anything to his system. This potential solution to the tension above suggests that 
a strengthening of an existing component, knowledge’s status as a prime condition, suffices. This 
approach attempts to use another feature of Williamsonian knowledge to explain why knowledge 
causes people to act differently than those with other mental states (and can thus serve as the norm 
for action). Williamson demonstrates how knowledge’s status as a prime condition provides strong 
explanatory value and suggests that the value of prime conditions mirrors those of other broad 
conditions (Williamson 2000, 75). Per Williamson, a condition is prime “if and only if it is not 
composite” where a condition is composite “if and only if it is the conjunction of a narrow [viz., 
internal] condition…and some environmental [viz., external] condition” (66).10 Williamson says 
such conditions are not as easily defeated and this is relevant to our explanation of action (78-80, 
86-87). When the internal and external components of our beliefs are so closely related, our beliefs 
will persist in the absence of changes to both components. Where the external component is 
                                                 
10 Prime conditions, in other words, require matching between internal and external states that can be recombined into 
a new condition (Williamson 2000, Chapter 3). 
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factive, our internal component should be sensitive only to fact-based evidence. Persistence should 
only falter in the face of new evidence. This is not true of justified true belief.  
A Williamsonian who is reluctant to adopt KK or a version of Option (2) committed to 
e.g., pragmatic encroachment can use this primeness to, at the very least, explain the case 
motivating my claimed internal tension in Williamson. S/he can claim that this primeness can 
explain persistent action in the case of the robber who stays in a house longer when he knows that 
there is a diamond in the house than he would have stayed if he merely had a justified true belief 
in its presence (62). The robber does not give up on his belief as early and this explains his staying 
in the house longer. Williamson claims that individuals not only give up on their plans based on 
justified true beliefs earlier than their plans based on knowledge, they also give up on their justified 
true beliefs much earlier than they give up on their knowledge. If this story is correct, then 
knowledge’s status as a prime condition may explain why the robber is more persistent when he 
has knowledge. Whether this persistence continues without iteration is questionable, but it is 
possible. The Williamsonian can then claim that the response generalizes, so adopting a version of 
Option (2) does not even need to be strictly additive. In light of this possibility, one may be tempted 
to emphasize the primeness of knowledge to explain why those with (even un-iterable) knowledge 
act differently than those with justified true beliefs. The primeness explanation is the least radical 
version of Option (2) available and the one most charitable to Williamson’s project. Indeed, one 
may question whether it is even a version of Option (2) since it reemphasizes primeness in his 
view, rather than adding something to it.  
Unfortunately, even if primeness helps with the robbery case, which is questionable, the 
primeness of knowledge may not fully account for an explanation of all our actions. Williamson 
claims that one can know a lot of things “without being prepared to bet [one’s] house on them” 
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(86). Yet his approach does not seem to account for why we do and should act the way we do in 
the face of high stakes bets. Recall Hawthorne and Stanley’s case of betting a penny against the 
lives of ten children (2008, 588).11 Hawthorne and Stanley note that subjective certainty about a 
fact where one is not in a position to know is insufficient to justify taking the bet. I believe this is 
correct and would add that most people would not take the bet. This common response cannot be 
explained on the basis of knowledge; knowledge seems to explain the opposite action. Something 
else must explain this action and why it remains normatively acceptable. 
Williamson suggests one should be able to explain and justify one’s actions on the basis of 
knowledge. He accordingly seems to think you can take high stakes bets. This raises a question: 
How can Williamson explain that what you should do and what people actually do seems to change 
as stakes get higher? Explanation of this fact is necessary for establishing the explanatory value of 
knowledge as a norm for action. Without an account of high stakes cases, the value of knowledge-
first epistemology for our explanation and norm of action is questionable. Primeness will not 
explain such cases. Prime knowledge seems to indicate a match between the fact that you will win 
and your internal recognition of this fact. Together, the matching features seem to suggest it is 
acceptable to accept the bet above. You are not wrong in the ‘good case’ presented. Insofar as you 
really know, you will not be wrong in nearby ‘bad’ cases either. Accepting the bet nonetheless 
appears wrongful given the high stakes involved. This is particularly true when you do not know 
that you know that you will win the one cent lottery, but remains true even after iteration. It is also 
unlikely. Both normatively and descriptively, the fact that one has knowledge about an outcome 
appears insufficient to account for the action of taking a high stakes bet. Ultimately, one must 
recognize that the external facts we need to ‘match’ with our internal views include practical facts 
                                                 
11 Hawthorne & Stanley (2008) frame this in terms of a contract that pays out differently depending on which of two 
outcomes arises, but it is structurally similar to a bet.  
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about stakes. This requires acceptance of pragmatic encroachment Williamson would not license. 
As I will now explain, this is not a problem for Williamson’s followers as so-supplementing 
Williamson’s view helps avoid the tension above. 
Pragmatic Encroachment: The Best Version of Option (2) 
Pragmatic encroachment appears to be necessary to solve the issues facing high stakes 
cases. Fortunately for the knowledge-first program in general (if not for Williamson himself), 
treating pragmatic encroachment as a supplement in an Option (2) approach not only solves the 
problem of high stakes. It can also help resolve the tension between the non-luminosity of 
knowledge and the knowledge norm of action by explaining why iterable or iterated knowledge 
may be required for one to act differently than those with mere justified true beliefs in some cases, 
but uniterated or even uniterable knowledge may be enough for people to justifiably act differently 
than those with justified true beliefs in other cases. Where pragmatic encroachment allows 
epistemic norms to vary across contexts, it can allow different types of knowledge to serve as 
norms for action across contexts. Where this move particularly explains a class of actions 
Williamson’s project has difficulty explaining without running afoul of the general non-
Williamsonian knowledge-first program, recognition of pragmatic encroachment in the 
Williamsonian project should appeal to those who are generally sympathetic to his view, but who 
recognize the tensions above. 
The benefits of using pragmatic encroachment as a specification of Option (2) are 
numerous. At the most basic level, pragmatic encroachment explains why it seems like luminous 
knowledge is required in the robbery case and similar cases. In short, the stakes are sufficiently 
high in these cases that the knowledge needed to act in an epistemically responsible manner is 
functionally equivalent to luminous knowledge. In the robbery case, the high stakes include the 
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possibility of jail time for breaking and entering and at least attempted burglary. The risk of censure 
and sanction in the robbery case is high and the probability thereof gets higher as time passes. The 
evidence required to justify assuming such risk must be great to be pragmatically appropriate given 
the circumstances and the evidence set may even need to include something akin to knowledge of 
one’s knowledge if the risk of censure and sanction is sufficiently high.  
Hawthorne and Stanley’s version of the knowledge norm for action and how they deal with 
high stakes concerns is instructive for the wider set of high stakes cases. They agree that it is more 
natural to appraise behavior in terms of knowledge than justified belief and provides greater 
explanatory force. They follow Williamson in recognizing knowledge as the norm for action and 
suggest that “our ordinary folk appraisals of the behavior of others suggest that the concept of 
knowledge is intimately intertwined with the rationality of action” (2008, 571). When individuals 
can act on the basis of a given belief that is not knowledge, we rightly chastise them for acting on 
improper epistemic grounds. Hawthorne and Stanley’s Knowledge-Knowledge Principle asserts 
that you should treat “the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that p….When 
someone acts in a belief that does not amount to knowledge, she violates the norm, and is hence 
subject to criticism” (577). This explains both why people can act and why particular people do 
act in certain ways. Knowledge changes any given rationalizing reason (viz., one’s reason for 
acting) into an individual’s motivating reason (viz., one’s reason for acting) (580). Yet Hawthorne 
and Stanley’s case-based argument for the knowledge norm leads them to depart from Williamson 
and hew closer to my position. For instance, they offer a revised lottery case and note that selling 
a ticket to a 10 000 ticket lottery with a $5 000 prize for one cent on the basis that you will not win 
and will thus get nothing is irrational; they state that it “is not acceptable to act on one’s belief that 
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one will lose the lottery” because that belief is not knowledge (572).12 Their invocation of the 
lottery case suggests that pragmatic facts may alter the level of knowledge required on the 
epistemic condition for knowledge.  
Hawthorne and Stanley’s reasoning seems to suggest that one cannot take certain bets even 
if one does have knowledge (and the requisite desire).13 Even knowing which outcome will arise 
in a given circumstance seems problematic where the stakes are sufficiently high. Betting on the 
death of 10 children for even the guarantee of one cent is an unlikely, wrongful action. It is even 
morally wrongful than a robbery and at least as epistemically vexing. Objective certainty and/or 
(at least uniterable) knowledge that is constituted by Williamsonian evidence can be equally 
problematic across many cases. Hawthorne and Stanley thus sketch a concept of stakes-sensitive 
knowledge that builds on this example. It is instructive for those trying to account for high stakes 
without overriding the epistemic norm of action and suffering explanatory loss: 
If knowledge is constitutively related to one’s practical environment, then it is open to us 
to claim that while one may know that p in a situation where not much is at stake as 
concerns the proposition that p, one loses knowledge once one enters an environment 
where a good deal is at stake as regards the truth or falsity of the proposition that p. On 
such a view, knowledge – and hence probability 1 – vanishes when the stakes go up (588). 
 
Given high stakes on this picture, one cannot act since one no longer knows a given piece of 
information. Knowledge retains its role as the norm for action and is operative in its negation. One 
is not warranted in taking the high stakes bet above because one does not know the outcome given 
the high stakes involved. Probability 1 is not guaranteed in sufficiently high stakes scenarios. 
                                                 
12 See Williamson (2000, 576) for more: 
 
Our reaction to the lottery case is not that the subject does not know that he will not win the lottery because 
it is not rational to act upon that supposition. It is rather that it is not rational to act on the proposition that 
she will not win because she does not know that she will not win. 
13 Technically, their cases concern subjective certainty, not knowledge. One cannot sell one’s lottery ticket on the 
basis of a belief that s/he will lose since s/he does not know that s/he will lose. Yet subjective certainty may not license 
taking other, similar bets where the stakes are high enough. Similar reasoning applies to knowledge as a norm for 
action. 
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Pragmatic facts about the environment help to constitute knowledge. Practical facts about high 
stakes in particular are capable of eliminating knowledge, helping to explain why individuals do 
not (and should not) take high stakes bets even when they appear to have knowledge of an outcome 
absent such stakes. On Hawthorne and Stanley’s view, then, one needs to act on a knowledge-
desire pair to act on the basis of proper epistemic reasons (rather than a belief-desire pair). Yet the 
standards for what will count as knowledge get higher as the pragmatic consequences of action 
rise. These stakes help constitute what knowledge is. 
Further thought experiments support pragmatic encroachment as a solution to the 
aforementioned tension in Williamson identified. It is easy to think of low stakes cases in which 
non-iterable knowledge is (epistemically) sufficient for one to act on his or her desire. The simplest 
cases are basic cases built on perceptual knowledge. I know that there is a pen and a piece of paper 
in front of me and want to write this paragraph. While Sosa and other argue that we are not always 
warranted in acting on such banal knowledge, it is not a stretch to say that I am (all-else-being-
equal) epistemically justified in grabbing for the pen and paper. This intuition that knowledge 
justifies action in low stakes scenarios likely follows in complicated cases too.14 The reader can 
imagine many analogous cases. Non-iterable knowledge (when paired with desire) clearly appears 
sufficient to justify action in many lower stake cases.15 Williamson’s hard cases are the high stakes 
                                                 
14 Consider, for instance, the case where one desires a hot dog at a ballpark and knows that hot dogs are available at a 
concession stand. No complicated thought experiments or philosophical trickery is necessary to say that this person is 
warranted in walking to the concession stand. Yet sticklers may add that in this case, there is no issue with deliveries, 
it is early in a ballgame, and there has never been a sellout of hot dogs or issue with delivery this early in the game. 
While one can even add that the person is in question is the hot dog delivery person and delivered the hot dog earlier 
in the day, the delivery person is hardly the only person who is warranted in walking to the stand. 
15 In some of these cases, it will seem like even a lower epistemic state may play this role. These cases are the most 
popular counterexamples to Williamson’s knowledge norm of action in the literature (see McGlynn 2014 again) but 
need not detain us here. This piece seeks to explain and resolve an internal tension in Williamson’s view. This piece 
does not attempt to argue for the knowledge norm of action as preferable to all other lower epistemic norms of action. 
Moreover, these cases can be easily built into Williamson’s picture and my variant. On Williamson’s picture, they can 
be recast as either cases where non-iterable knowledge suffices or cases where Williamson can plausibly claim that 
knowledge is necessary but lower epistemic standards that aim at knowledge can appear to play this role. Alternatively, 
in my variant, knowledge attributions in these cases are easier to establish due to lower stakes. 
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ones. They support adopting pragmatic encroachment. I already noted that Williamson’s own 
robbery case seems to show that iterable knowledge is necessary in high stakes cases and raises 
the aforementioned tension in his view. The plausibility of the normative goals shifting depending 
on stakes becomes clearer when one keeps the positive stakes constant and lower the negative 
stakes. Consider the following variants of the robbery case: 
Incompetent Government. The robber seeks the same diamond and has the same evidence 
of all relevant factors and same mental states as in Williamson’s original case. Yet a police 
strike has left the department shortchanged and unable to patrol the streets. Police rarely 
visit this neighborhood unless called. In the day in question, many of the strikebreakers 
have been pulled off active duty to attend a celebration in their honor at city hall on the 
other side of town. 
 
Prison Abolitionist. All the conditions in Williamson’s original robbery case obtain except 
that society has decided not to punish breaking and entering and/or theft with prison 
sentences. The punishment is changed to a notice in the newspaper that the robber 
committed a moral wrong and a literal slap on the wrist. 
 
The claim that non-iterable knowledge is sufficient for the robber to justifiably stay in the house 
in these circumstances is far more plausible than the claim that in Williamson’s original case. Yet 
something lower than knowledge likely does not justify staying in the house longer either. The 
possibility of prison in the first case certainly justifies epistemic caution. It is unwise to stay in the 
house without knowledge in the second case too. Indeed, the public censure in that case is supposed 
to be a deterrent on immoral actions in standard ethical theories and no one likes a literal slap on 
the wrist. As stakes get lower in a variety of cases, then, it appears that non-iterable knowledge, 
but no lower epistemic status, will suffice to warrant action. The apparent requirement for iterable 
knowledge in Williamson’s original case may simply be a case of a higher standard for knowledge 
attribution in those higher stakes cases. 
Pragmatic encroachment, then, explains the appropriate epistemic responses in both the 
robbery case and variants thereof. Experimental philosophy suggests that it is also necessary to 
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explain a wider set of high stakes cases (Pinillos 2012). Where the knowledge of action is supposed 
to be both explanatory and normative, this alone counts as an achievement. Yet this does not 
exhaust the benefits of adopting pragmatic encroachment as a specification of Option (2). It is also 
worth noting that this option is the least radical departure from Williamson’s original view that 
explains these cases and resolves the tension with minimal changes to Williamson’s picture. 
Williamson would not accept this solution to the purported tension in his view. He repeatedly 
rejects pragmatic encroachment. He may personally be unable to accept it given his other 
commitments. Yet giving up on the falsity of KK would be an even more radical departure. 
Williamson denies KK even more often than he denies pragmatic encroachment. Giving up on the 
knowledge norm of action, in turn, may seem like a less radical departure than giving up on the 
falsity of KK, but it may be a bigger tactical mistake. For John Gibbons, knowledge’s explanatory 
and normative role in action is necessary to even establish knowledge as a mental state, a de 
minimus requirement of any knowledge-first epistemology (2001, 579ff). For Williamson, it is 
crucial to establishing the primacy of that mental state. This is arguably nearly as important for 
motivating knowledge-first epistemology. Dropping the knowledge norm of action would also be 
a more radical departure than accepting pragmatic encroachment.  
Indeed, Williamson provides some room for letting pragmatic encroachment into his view. 
Williamson sometimes speaks as if probability 1 cannot be lost. Yet, elsewhere, he seems to 
recognize that new knowledge can change other knowledge. He writes, “[p]resent knowledge is 
less vulnerable than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence, which is 
not to say that it is completely invulnerable to such undermining” (Williamson 2000, 79). New 
knowledge about stakes could plausibly be understood as new evidence that rationally undermines 
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previous knowledge about which of two outcomes is likely to arise.16 Williamson may not let this 
recognition lead him down the path to pragmatic encroachment, but it is the closest path he can 
take to resolve the above tension in his view. 
 If these benefits accrue to the pragmatic encroachment-imbued version of Option (2), this 
provides further reason to accept it in lieu of other alternatives: in short, if pragmatic encroachment 
can explain the cases above and thereby resolve the tension in Williamson’s view, then Option (1) 
(adopting KK) and/or rejecting the knowledge norm of action are/is no longer necessary. 
Pragmatic encroachment can resolve the tension between the non-luminosity of knowledge and 
the knowledge norm of action by explaining why iterable or iterated knowledge appears to be 
required for one to act differently than those with mere justified true beliefs in some cases, but 
uniterated or even uniterable knowledge appears to be enough for people to justifiably act 
differently than those with justified true beliefs in other cases. The choice between adopting KK 
and rejecting the knowledge norm of action thus no longer presents itself. Adopting KK is 
unpalatable for most theorists (but again see Greco 2014). As noted above, rejecting the knowledge 
norm of action is unpalatable for knowledge-firsters. Both are unpalatable to me. Where 
knowledge-first epistemology is not of the most fruitful areas of research in contemporary 
epistemology, I see no reason to reject it outright due to a tension that can be easily solved. 
Option (2) and a Non-Williamson Approach to the Problem 
Ultimately, then, an additive, potentially non-Williamsonian approach is needed to explain 
why we act differently in the fact of high stakes. I further believe that pragmatic encroachment is 
necessary to explain why we justifiably act differently on the basis of uniterable knowledge than 
we would on the basis of justified true beliefs in some cases, but not others. The epistemic norms 
                                                 
16 This is particularly true where ‘E=K’ as described in note 17 below. 
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in, for instance, a high stakes case are qualitatively different from those in low stakes cases. This 
may explain why Williamson’s robber needs iterated knowledge to stay in a house searching for a 
diamond, but even uniterable knowledge may lead others to act differently than those with justified 
true beliefs when a lengthy prison sentence for breaking and entering and robbery is not a possible 
outcome of a given line of action. When these issues are clear, pragmatic encroachment appears 
necessary for knowledge to play its full explanatory and normative role in many cases. It is thus 
necessary for establishing one of the values of knowledge as the primary epistemic mental state: 
its role in action. The standard for knowledge sufficient for acting where the knowledge norm of 
action obtains varies with stakes. 
There are, however, costs to this position even beyond the potentially damning recognition 
that probability 1 may not be persistent (and therefore may not always be reliable). Most notably, 
this appears to require an account of stakes that is difficult to develop. Explaining how practical 
facts operate on our knowledge is difficult to determine, particularly where knowledge is the only 
evidence base available for judging new facts.17 The first issue is that it is unclear how high stakes 
change knowledge. They appear to be constitutive elements of knowledge that change with it, but 
this language undermines claims about the unanalyzable nature of knowledge. Iteration again 
raises its head. Whether you need to know that you know practical facts is important for 
determining whether you know a given proposition that is partially constituted by that fact. High 
stakes as a mechanism appear mysterious. This is related to a second potential issue. It is similarly 
unclear when stakes are sufficiently high to change the nature of knowledge operative in a given 
                                                 
17 This is the case in Williamson’s E(vidence)=K(nowledge) framework. The ‘E=K’ thesis “equates S’s evidence with 
S’s knowledge, for every individual or community S in any possible situation….The concept knows is fundamental, 
the primary implement of epistemological inquiry” (Williamson 2000, 185). On this view, “all of one’s knowledge 
serves as the foundation for all one’s justified beliefs” (186). 
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scenario. It is thus unclear when a norm warrants or negates a particular action and thus when one 
can or should judge individuals’ actions positively or negatively. 
Weighing the benefits and risks, I am willing to bite the bullet suggesting there is an (at 
least quasi-)additive component to this pragmatic encroachment account. Knowledge-first 
epistemology should accept pragmatic encroachment in its descriptive and normative action 
regardless of whether Williamson would do so. This ‘addition’ is not a particularly damning one. 
Knowledge can remain primitive even as one acknowledges that practical facts have an impact on 
it. Indeed, Gibbons (2001) recognizes that the world plays a causal role in our actions. Allowing 
certain practical facts to fulfill this role is not particularly problematic. Knowledge can remain 
prime so long as one recognizes that one’s beliefs must track these practical facts in order to remain 
knowledge. One must know these practical facts in order for them to be operative.  
Knowing when stakes sufficiently change is more problematic. Whether one also needs to 
know that they know these practical facts is tricky. I do not argue for a pragmatic encroachment-
reliant version of KK above, but instead deny that adopting KK is necessary to resolve the tension 
that I identify. The lack of luminosity here appears to be no different from other views. Yet I grant 
that it is plausible that some form of luminosity appears necessary to explain why people act in 
certain ways. Regardless, a full account of when stakes change is necessary to fill out the 
knowledge-first epistemology and confirm its explanatory and normative value in accounting for 
action. This cost for future scholars is small when compared to giving up on one of the key values 
of knowledge as the primitive epistemological concept. 
Conclusion 
 While some scholars think that luminous knowledge can best serve as the basis for a 
knowledge norm of action, one need not adopt KK to adopt the knowledge norm of action. 
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Recognizing pragmatic encroachment is only a small variation to Williamson’s knowledge-first 
epistemology and resolves the tension between his anti-luminosity and his knowledge norm of 
action. This variation to Williamson’s view can explain Williamson’s robbery case (which I use 
as my exemplar of the apparent tension in his view above), other high stakes cases (where the 
temptation to adopt KK as part of the knowledge norm of action may be greatest), and differing 
intuitions between high and low stakes cases. Recognizing pragmatic encroachment thereby avoids 
forcing a choice between adopting the knowledge norm of action and KK and rejecting both; it 
should resolve the tension in Williamson’s view across a number of non-robbery cases. 
Emphasizing other aspects of Williamson’s view and/or otherwise altering his view will 
require changes that are more radical or fail to explain many cases.18 Emphasizing knowledge’s 
status as a prime condition, by contrast, does not vary Williamson’s position at all and serves to 
provide at least a partial explanation of cases where iterated knowledge appears necessary but is 
inoperative, but this condition cannot explain or correctly account for our normative implications 
about high stakes cases. These issues can only be resolved by allowing pragmatic encroachment 
to affect the prime condition: knowledge. Further knowledge about practical facts, particularly 
high stakes, is necessary to complete the pragmatic encroachment picture, but this is a small price 
to pay for establishing a key value of knowledge as a prime condition.  
Where pragmatic encroachment explains a class of actions Williamson’s project has 
difficulty explaining without running afoul of the general non-Williamsonian knowledge-first 
program, the supplementation of Williamson’s view to recognize pragmatic encroachment should 
appeal to those who are generally sympathetic to his view, but recognize its internal tensions. 
                                                 
18 E.g., adding components to Williamsonian knowledge makes knowledge analyzable, which is a more radical 
variation of Williamsonian knowledge, while adopting a justified belief or luminous knowledge norm of action would 
change Williamson’s account of the norm of action entirely, undermining one of the core components of his argument 
for knowledge-first epistemology. 
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Pragmatic encroachment, then, can resolve a tension at the center of one of the most promising 
research projects in contemporary epistemology. This provides further (non-dispositive) reason to 
adopt it beyond those recognized by the pragmatic encroachment pioneers.  
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